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The value that associates private property regimes with better management of arable land
played a consistent role in colonial policy and practice in "African" areas of Southern/Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe). In the woodlands, however, common property management systems characterized
African areas. This persisted in the post-Independence state, both in the Communal Areas, and in
the newly demarcated Resettlement Areas. Recommendations by the recent Land Tenure
Commission (1993), however, are set to change tenure in the woodlands in Resettlement Areas
from common property to private property, on the perception that the common property system
fails to sustainably manage the woodlands. In this paper, the apparent failure in common property
woodland management in a case study of a Model A resettlement scheme in Zimbabwe is
explored. Tenure insecurity and the types of controls and institutions in the woodlands are
examined as possible sources of the failure. The major stress on the woodlands, besides clearance
of land for agriculture, emerges as resource poaching by Communal Area neighbours. The
currently popular notion of resource-sharing as a possible solution to this problem is discussed. In
the final analysis the author finds that privatization is unlikely to solve the management crisis as it
inadequately deals with the major problem of resource poaching. This failure is part of a wider
conceptual problem of dealing with Zimbabwe's different land-use categories in isolation, rather
than as an interrelated system. The paper is framed by an analysis of how a new focus on tenure
issues, particularly privatization, in the land redistribution process in Zimbabwe fits with a
growing trend wherein issues of justice and development for the rural poor are eclipsed by a
discourse of "efficiency" and "productivity".1 Mr. Chirere (deceased), Master Farmer. Sengezi Resettlement Area, Wedza District Zimbabwe.
Interview July 29 1995. Mr. Chirere was commenting on the positive effects, in his view, of a change
to private tenure in the currently communally used woodlands in resettlement.
2 See Southern Rhodesia The Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs and Chief Native
Commissioner for the 1940s to 1960s. A detailed historical account is beyond the scope of this paper.
Please see Goebel 1997, Chapter Three, for more detail.
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The value that associates private property regimes with better management of arable land
played a consistent role in colonial policy and practice in "African" areas of Southern/Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe). Colonial efforts to improve African farming productivity and land management were
underpinned by the institution of private land tenure relations to replace "communal" tenure. Most
notably, the creation of African Purchase Areas under the provision of the Land Apportionment
Act of 1930, and the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 both had private property relations at
their centres (Cheater 1990; Schmidt 1992; Shutt 1995). In the woodlands, however, there was
no comparable link in colonial thinking between improving woodland management in African
areas and privatization of tenure. Throughout colonial times common property management
systems characterized the social forest in African areas. Colonial efforts to improve woodland
management in African areas focused not on tenure, but on a combination of afforestation
through eucalyptus woodlots and controls on African practices in the indigenous forests.
2 
Common property regimes in the woodlands in African areas persisted in the post-
Independence state, both in the Communal Areas (formerly the "Reserves" or "Tribal Trust
Lands"), and in the newly demarcated Resettlement Areas (see below). Recommendations by the3 Central to this paper is the Household Schedule used to interview a selected sample of 60
individuals, half men, half women. Direct quotations from these interviews are cited only be informant
number to protect anonymity. For example, 3.41f, means female informant from household number
41 in village 3.
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1993 Land Tenure Commission (Rukuni 1994), however, are set to change tenure in the
woodlands in Resettlement Areas from common property to private property, on the perception
that the common property system fails to manage the woodlands sustainably. This move
represents a shift in government thinking on woodland management, from a focus on peasant
practices to a focus on tenure system. 
In this paper, I probe what does indeed appear to be a failure in common property
woodland management in a case study of a Model A family farm resettlement scheme in
Zimbabwe.
3 In order to assess whether the tenure system is at the root of the problem, I
investigate a range of tenure issues. I look at tenure insecurity as a possible problem in the
management system. I then delineate the types of controls and institutions operating in the
woodlands and draw out the key internal weaknesses in the management system. Next, I examine
a conflict over use of woodland resources by neighbours in adjacent Communal Areas. This
"poaching" emerges as arguably the biggest strain on the social forest in the resettlement. The
social, political and economic dimensions of this conflict are discussed at length. The central
problems appear to be the acute resource shortages in Communal Areas, and Communal Area
residents' sense of entitlement to resettlement resources. Given this conflict over resettlement
resources, I consider the currently popular notion of resource-sharing as a possible solution.
Given all the factors discussed, I address the question of whether private tenure is likely to solve
the problems of woodland management in resettlement. But first, the discussion must be located4 Cheater (1990) outlines the continuity of post-Independence policy in Communal Areas with
colonial policy on Reserves. The Communal Land Act of 1982 gave authority of land allocation in
CAs to the District Councils, hence continuing "the colonial process of subordinating custom to state
control" (Cheater 1990: 201). Ideology about "customary" rights and practices of land use and
allocation underpin the post-Independent discourse on CAs just as it did the colonial discourse on
Reserves. However, this policy ultimately increases state control through manipulation and
transformation of what is "customary".
5 Model A, Normal Intensive Resettlement, is the most common and is similar in structure to
communal lands: families are settled in nucleated villages and given permits to reside, cultivate and
depasture stock. Grazing and bush areas are treated as common property to all who fall within village
boundaries. This model also later included the Accelerated Intensive Resettlement model, designed
to deal with the problem of squatters on former commercial farms. The model followed model A
structures, but included a minimum of infrastructure and service development as a means to formalize
squatters' land use quickly. Model B is a cooperative model wherein groups of between 50 and 200
members live and farm cooperatively. Model C settles farmers through a lease system on state owned
estates, such as tobacco, coffee or dairy, and farmers benefit from state infrastructure such as
processing or marketing facilities. Model D is a grazing scheme rather than a resettlement model. In
all cases, ultimate land holding resides with the state. Of these models, Model A has dominated, and
Model B has been declared a failure. The scheme in this study is of the original Normal Intensive type,
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within the larger context of the discourse of land redistribution in post-Independence Zimbabwe.
In early post-Independence Zimbabwe, the issue of land was dominated by the need to
redress past injustices in land access through land redistribution. This affected views on tenure as
well as views on the causes of land degradation. At Independence, the new government had no
commitment to private property ideology. In fact, the new government favoured socialistic land
tenure relations motivated by revolutionary visions of just land redistribution and fair relations of
production. The former Tribal Trust Lands (Reserves) became "Communal Lands", emphasizing
the role of "home for all" initiated by the colonial government.
4 The resettlement program was
designed to redress the past injustices of land distribution. Upon Independence in 1980, the new
government moved quickly to establish schemes on unused or abandoned land, upon which
landless or destitute peasants were to be settled. Of the four main models of the resettlement
programme, none operated with private tenure.
5and is one of the first to have been established in the country (1981). 
6 See "No cash for resettlement programme as State acquires 25 farms" The Herald April 4 1996:1.
"Zimbabwe and Britain still discuss resettlement funding" The Herald May 21 1996. "State to get
British help to acquire land" The Herald September 7 1996.
7 "State to compulsorily acquire 27 farms" The Herald December 29 1995:1. "Farmers turn abusive
over land issue" The Sunday Mail June 23 1996: 1.
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In the early years of post-Independence Zimbabwe, the critical views of the Liberation
War also set the tone for government analysis of land degradation in the African sector.
Degradation was said to be caused by the unjust land distribution policy of the colonialists,
wherein peasants were forced off the most fertile land, and pushed into unsustainable practices
due to land shortage. The remedy was large scale land redistribution and resettlement. In the
Transitional National Development Plan 1982/83 - 1984/85, government planned to spend $260
million over the plan period to settle 162,000 families on 4.2 million hectares of unutilized and 3
million hectares of underutilized commercial land (Zimbabwe 1982). 
The resettlement program has remained central to the government's rhetorical commitment
to undoing the colonial legacy of white domination in most of the good agricultural land in the
country. However, in practice government has consistently failed to meet its own targets for
resettlement. Government primarily blames lack of funds for land purchase and infrastructural
development
6 and the intransigence of white commercial farmers.
7 Other factors stalling the
establishment of sufficient numbers of schemes to meet demand include the centrality of
commercial agricultural to the Zimbabwean economy and the subsequent lobbying power of large-
scale commercial farmers, pressure from multilateral institutions like the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank to protect commercial farming, and government corruption through
which acquired land is given to ministers and other government friends. To date, between 62,0008 "Land shortage problem deteriorates" The Sunday Mail June 16 1996.
9 "Resettlement funds too low" The Herald August 3 1995: 12.
10 In my area, this was indeed the case on the ground, not just on paper. Preferred settlers were
refugees or squatters, particularly those whose current status was a result of the war. Particular
favour was given to those who had been active in the war. People were asked if they had been to
Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana or Tanzania because of the war (Former Ward Councillor,
September 1996, Field Assistant Interview, Field Diary Village 3, Book I).
11 Resettlement Officer, Interview July 17 1996; Former Ward Councillor, September 1996, Research
Assistant Interview, Field Diary Village 3, Book I. The District Administrator of Hwedza District
asserts, however, that while there is no shortage of applicants who meet the new criteria (they have
a waiting list of about 500 people), allocations are still made to the "needy" such as those displaced
by developments like dam construction or the expansion of the growth point (Interview February 18
1997).
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and 70,000 families have been resettled,
8 while government estimates that about 200,000 families
are waiting for resettlement plots.
9 (See Drinkwater 1989,  Elliott 1991, Goebel 1997, Moyo
1996, Nkala 1996, Wekwete 1991 and Zinyama 1991 for analyses of resettlement since
Independence).
Alongside missed targets for resettlement, government policy increasingly downplays the
question of justice in land distribution, and focuses instead on questions of "efficiency" and
"productivity". This is seen, for example, in the change in selection criteria for resettlement
farmers. In the beginning, the landless, returning war refugees, and the poorest people were
granted land (Wekwete 1991; Zinyama 1991).
10 As early as 1982, however, plots were granted to
Master Farmers as well as the "landless poor" (Alexander 1994: 333; Munslow 1985: 46). By the
mid 1980s, Government perceived that the land was "underutilized", and all settlers were to have
Master Farmer training by 1986/7. But as the available land quickly filled up, criteria became even
stricter: in the current context, applicants must also demonstrate farmer success through
ownership of such implements as a scotchcart and a plough.
11 As the Minister of Lands and Water
Resources, Cde Kumbirai Kangai states: "Land should only be given to people with the potential12 "Land Shortage Problem Deteriorates". The Sunday Mail June 16 1996. See also: "Resettlement
must depend on productivity: seminar" The Herald April 16 1996: 1. "Comment: Landmark decision"
The Sunday Mail August 18 1996: 10. "Residents with resources sought for resettlement" The Herald
August 20 1996: 7.
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to fully utilize it".
12 As only about 20% of farmers in Communal Areas will be able to meet the
new criteria, the selection process is likely to enhance the differentiation processes in rural areas
further, deepening inequality in terms of land distribution (Moyo 1996). 
There has also been a growing acceptance of the pre-Independence construction of the
African peasant as "destructive". Land degradation in African areas thus becomes a question of
farming practice rather than a result of land shortage. This facilitates changing the emphasis of the
aims of resettlement from an issue of justice, to one of productivity and sustainable resource
management. Influential voices had urged a focus on peasant practices in Communal Lands and
caution regarding the role of resettlement in rural development since Independence (Drinkwater
1989). The Riddell Commission of 1981, while noting the need to devote some land to
resettlement, recommended "a substantial restructuring and transformation of agricultural
production within the peasant sector" (Riddell 1981: para 686). The Chavunduka Commission of
1982 recognized the problem of land shortage, but suggested that bad husbandry practices were a
more serious and fundamental problem (Chavunduka 1982: para 266). Chavunduka urged caution
in focusing on resettlement to the cost of improvement in Communal Areas (Chavunduka 1982:
para 284).
In the 1990s, the duo of "productivity" and "efficiency" in the post-Independence
discourse on land has been joined by the issue of land tenure as a dominant thread:
Due to the colonial history of this country and the communal land tenure system13 Josiah Hungwe, Governor of Masvingo, quoted in The Herald. "Land-use seminar opens",
September 28 1995.
14 K. Kangai, Minister of Lands and Water Development, May 28 1997, speaking at the Consultative
Conference on Land in Zimbabwe, convened by the NGO ZERO, and held at the ZESA Training
Centre, Harare, May 27-28 1997. See also: "Big change for resettlement areas" The Herald August
7 1995: 7. "Major changes in land tenure" The Herald August 16 1996: 1.
15 Subject to settler agreement.
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which is a result of this history, the use of these communal lands has been a free-
for-all affair with nobody feeling responsible for the proper or sustainable use of
this land, since the user has user-rights only and no responsibility for future
generations.
13
In 1993, President Mugabe appointed a Commission of Inquiry, headed by Professor Mandivamba
Rukuni, to investigate the appropriateness of each land tenure system in the rural areas. These
were to be considered "in relation to sustainable resource management, farm productivity and
investment" (Rukuni 1994, Executive Summary: iii). 
Government accepted many of the Land Tenure Commission's recommendations,
including those on resettlement.
14 In its analysis of resettlement, the Commission states that tenure
insecurity and the weakness of local institutions has meant that common property resources have
been poorly managed. It therefore recommends that all current resettlement villages of both
Model A family farms
15 and Model B cooperatives, be redemarcated into private holdings which
would include homestead, fields and grazing areas. All new resettlement schemes should follow
this pattern. The permit system should be abandoned, and settlers be given 99 year leases with
options to purchase after an initial ten year "trial" period, in which settlers demonstrate serious
farming intentions and good practices.
This new focus on tenure issues in relation to land reform should be read through the post-8
Independence experience of land reform to date. An early focus on justice was displaced by the
primacy of "productivity" and "efficiency". Will the new theme of "tenure reform" be used as a
smokescreen for further stalling on land redistribution? Perhaps more crucially, can tenure reform
at the micro level have an real meaning or effect when gross inequality in land distribution at the
macro level remains?
This article addresses this question through the specific case of the woodland management
crisis in resettlement. Is this crisis primarily about tenure relations as the Land Tenure
Commission suggests? Will privatizing tenure in resettlement solve the crisis? To explore these
questions, I evaluate tenure security, management systems under varying degrees of private
control, rules, institutions and the nature of the conflict with the Communal Area neighbours in
order to evaluate privatization as a "solution".
1. Tenure Security and Management Systems.
The Land Tenure Commission expressed concern about the lack of tenure security felt by
residents of resettlement (Rukuni 1994). Recent evaluations of land tenure systems suggest that
the security of tenure appears to be more important than their form (ie common or private) in
defining the sustainability of the system and users' willingness to invest in long term improvement
(Fortmann and Bruce 1988: 3). Does the type of tenure system in resettlement lead to a feeling of
insecurity among settlers? Is this a cause of weak management in the social forest?
Model A Resettlement is a family farm model. It grants usufruct rights and management
systems under ultimate state ownership. Farmers are given three permits: one to reside, one to
plough, and one to depasture livestock. The permits, while having no expiry date, have tended to
be renewed every five years, and in theory can be revoked if a settler is unproductive. On paper,16 Interview with former Village Chairman, Village 1, July 29 1995. This informant also mentions "we
were war-minded", which he states led people to engage in unsustainable and destructive tree-cutting
practices in the early years of Resettlement. My analysis of this statement is that people were
disoriented by the war, and acted in ways that disregarded the future.
17 Interview with Secondary School Headmaster, April 11 1996.
18 Interview with Resettlement Officer, May 9 1996.
19 Response to Household Schedule III. 9.
20 Ibid.
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this appears to be a situation of insecurity of tenure, and some studies have identified this (Cliffe
1986 noted in Fortmann and Bruce 1993). Other scholars have found that people are secure
enough to build houses and plant fruit trees (Cusworth and Walker 1988 noted in Fortmann and
Bruce 1993). 
In the study site, there is some indication that settlers at first felt insecurity because of the
permit system, which is connected to reckless cutting of trees in the early years.
16 There was also
extensive confusion in the beginning about the purpose of being moved into the Resettlement
scheme, with many people reportedly not coming by choice, but being "chosen" by their headmen.
Many people feared they were being sent to do forced labour on the farms, as before
Independence people were often forced to work there if their cattle strayed onto the farms.
17
Despite this insecure beginning, settlers are currently treated as permanent residents, and permits
are not generally revoked. According to the Resettlement Officer, it would be nearly impossible to
evict an "unproductive" farmer, once they were established there.
18 According to the settlers, the
place belongs to them, largely because they do not have any other homes: "we take this place as
our own because there is nowhere for us to go" (1.35f).
19 Also, they feel entitled because "we
were given by the government" (2.9f).
20 It is common practice for people to bury their dead in the
area, rather than returning them kumusha (original home in Communal Lands). Partly this is for21 Ibid.
22 Grundy and Elliott also found this in other resettlement sites (Grundy 1995: 121; Elliott 1995: 7).
23 The difference in men's and women's perceptions on what would constitute increased security is
an important topic which I intend to treat in another article.
24 Household Schedule II. 6.
25 This finding is consistent with other studies in Communal Areas in Zimbabwe, which find fruit tree
planting in the homestead area a common practice (Campbell and Musvoto 1995; Campbell,
Vermeullen and Lynam 1991; Fortmann and Nabane 1992). Grundy also found this in her
Resettlement study site (Grundy 1995: 121).
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practical reasons (kumusha is very far in some cases). But the effect is to contribute to people's
sense of ownership of the land: "yes <it changes how we feel about the land> because we can't
leave our dead here <ie leave them behind>, so we can't go anywhere" (2.2f).
21
In spite of the apparent tenure insecurity as indicated by Resettlement policy, therefore, it
appears that settlers do feel reasonably secure, or at the least, entitled to the land.
22 Tenure
insecurity, therefore, does not appear to be a central problem, nor to be strongly linked to
problems in woodland management. Settlers would rather have greater security of tenure (Rukuni
1994).
23 Nevertheless, people do not feel under serious threat of eviction, and hence it would be
wrong to read people's behaviours as related to some kind of tenure insecurity. 
People's tenure security is expressed through tree-planting and other conservation
measures. Nearly all the people interviewed on the topic (56 out of 60), said their household had
planted trees.
24 However, tree planting also seems to be affected by the extent of privatized
control in different areas of the resettlement family's holding. Most of the trees planted were fruit
trees planted in the homestead area, where families have their houses, granaries, a small homefield
and/or garden and often a fruit orchard. Trees planted in the homestead area are under the
private control of the household. A full 76% of households had planted an average of 11 fruit
trees in their homestead areas.
25 A large minority (42%) of the sample had planted eucalyptus,26 Participatory Rural Appraisal data, September-October 1995.
27 There is a large literature on the relative merits of land holding systems as related to productivity
and sustainability (Berry 1989; Barrows and Roth 1990; Bromley (ed) 1992; Feeny et al 1990;
Fortmann and Bruce 1988; Hardin and Baden 1977; Herring 1990b; Okoth-Ogendo 1989; Richards
1983). In neo-classical economic theory, it is often held that in common property tenure
arrangements, people have little incentive to work for long term productivity or environmental
management gains. This position has been refined since the 1960s when Hardin (1968) asserted that
common property regimes were incapable of caring for the environment because of people's tendency
to take a "free ride" in such systems. The only secure land management system, the argument went,
was private ownership. Currently, the more usual question is "under what conditions, and in what
forms" do common property regimes function (Fortmann and Bruce 1988: 1-3). Or, put another way,
in what contexts does privatized tenure actually increase investment and security in land holding
(Barrows and Roth 1990).
28 Tenure Interview Schedules.
29 Interview with Agritex worker, July 10 1996.
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mainly in fields or homestead areas as private plantations. Arable fields, which are often at some
distance from the homestead, are under semi-private control, meaning that the fields themselves
are fully controlled by their "owners", as are many products found on the edges of fields such as
thatching grass, poles, or firewood. Some products, however, like wild fruits, may be gathered by
anybody. Only a few people mentioned large plantations in grazing or village plantation areas.
Grazing and bush areas are used communally, by each village as a whole, and hence are mainly
beyond private control. See Figure 1 for a "Resource Map" of one of the study villages. This map
shows the nucleated village and the location of different resource areas.
26
The fact that few households are involved in planting trees outside the homestead area
suggests that private control is an important factor in tree planting motivation.
27 While fields and
their resources are largely viewed as private,
28 it is easier to steal from someone's field area than
from their homestead. In communal management areas, such as grazing and village plantation
sites, the species planted (eucalyptus), was supplied by the Forestry Commission in cooperation
with the Agritex worker.
29 Hence, unlike with the planting of fruit trees in homesteads, this30 This is discussed at length below.
31 Interview with Agritex worker, July 10 1996. Preliminary transect work by biologist Buck Sanford
(University of Colorado) in the study site, support this point. Sanford found extensive cutting along
the border areas (Unpublished findings, 1996).
32 Research Assistant from Village 3. Also found by Grundy (1995), although apparently more
rampant than in my study site.
33 Interview with Agritex worker, July 10 1996.
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activity does not spring from the settlers' initiative. In addition, trees are still relatively abundant in
the area, so people may not be convinced of the importance of planting trees in field, grazing and
bush areas. Also, while people may view afforestation of grazing and bush areas as important,
drought, pests such as termites, and damage done by roaming goats and cattle all militate against
successful tree growing in these areas.  Finally, people's lack of control over the poaching of
resources by Communal Area neighbours in communal use areas of the bush and grazing areas
seriously undermines motivation to plant trees in these areas.
30 
While RA residents are not widely engaged in tree planting in communal use areas, they
do, however, appear to follow proper cutting and harvesting practices. These areas, the Agritex
worker asserts, are being depleted mainly by the CA "outsiders", especially along the boundaries,
through random and careless cutting.
31 It is reported that criminal elements within the
resettlement, who are often "youths", are said to engage in illegal practices such as the selling of
firewood. This practice was rampant in the mid 1980s, when people were even engaged in filling
lorries of firewood which were taken to Harare,
32 but is currently only happening on a low level.
33
People are also mostly inactive in other management practices in grazing areas: 47% of
the sample said they do nothing to improve grazing areas, 25% said they practice rotational
grazing, while 22% say they avoid veld fires or care for the grass. However, they are active in
preventing erosion along paths: only 3 respondents said they do nothing about erosion caused by34 Household Schedule II: 4, 5, 6.
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paths. Others mention filling holes and gullies with rocks, branches, bricks, or soil (55%), avoid
pulling sledges, ploughs or tree branches on the paths (20%), or leave grass, plant grass or plant
rhizomes (5%). In answering these types of questions, people use a language full on "modern"
conservationist concepts, indicating a high level of absorption of the Agritex view of erosion and
deforestation.
34
The major points of this section are as follows. Firstly, tenure insecurity is not felt
sufficiently by settlers to prevent them from investing in the area through tree planting and
conservation measures. As such, it is unlikely a cause of poor management in the woodlands.
Secondly, management of woodland resources, as represented by tree planting and conservation
measures, is most developed in the more privately controlled areas of the homestead and fields.
Active management in communally used areas is weak. However, a broader look at the controls
and practices in the social forest casts doubt on a simple equation between private control and
better woodland and resource management.
2. Rules and Institutions in the Social Forest
In the study area, as is found elsewhere in Zimbabwe (Bruce, Fortmann and Nhira 1993),
people collect a wide variety of products form a large number of different resource areas. Many of
these areas fall under communal use management regimes. People collect or use poles, thatching
grass, firewood, wild fruits, bush vegetables, herbal medicines, rope (fibre), grazing vegetation,
wild animals, fish, garden vegetables and water from their environment. Similar geography and
purposeful village demarcation by Resettlement authorities, mean that the villages have similar
kinds of resource areas. Resource areas mentioned by villagers were fields, dams, gum35 Participatory Rural Appraisal data, September-October 1995.
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plantations, wetlands (veld, mapani), kopjes (small rocky hills), rivers, bush, grazing areas, and
nearby Wedza Mountain. Of these resource areas, kopjes, fields, rivers and plantations emerge as
the most important among the resource areas, as more kinds of products in relatively large
quantities are being sourced in these areas.
35 Refer back to Figure 1 for a diagrammatic view of
the different resource areas. 
People depend on a variety of areas for the same product. See Table 1. In the exercise that
produced this table, villagers were given 20 stones, and asked to place them for each product
according to the relative amount obtained from the different resource areas. Table 1 gives Village
4 as an example.
Table 1. Product x Source Matrices for Women in Village 4.
                          Resource Areas
Product K F R G D W W.Mt P
Firewood 10  5  1  2  2
Thatch Grass 13  2  2  3
Poles 8  4  2  6 
Wild Fruits 5  1  1  4  3  6 
Fish 8 12




5   5 5  5  2  3  3  3 
Resource Area Key
K=Kopjes F=Fields R=Rivers G=Grazing Areas
D=Dams W=Wetlands/Veld W.Mt=Wedza Mountain
P=Plantations (Gum) B=Bush15
Table 1 indicates the interconnected nature of the resource areas in terms of supplying
household needs. People use five different areas to source firewood for example, and eight
different areas to source medicinal herbs. The use of different areas for the same category of
product is related to seasonal patterns, the use of different varieties, and the type of controls and
institutions operating in a certain area or product. This latter issue is discussed in the next section.
People have a complex and interrelated relationship to the social forest. The elimination of
communal use regimes could hence seriously limit some people's access to particular products.
For example, if a family's self-contained farm contains no gum plantations or kopjes, then the
family may face severe shortages of firewood, poles and ropes.
Nhira and Fortmann (1993) codify local management systems in an attempt to capture the
different types of controls operating in Communal Areas in Zimbabwe:
1. Sacred Controls. Community norms and controls based on traditional religious
beliefs and enforced by individual internationalization, community sanction, and the
authority of religious and traditional leaders.
2. Pragmatic Controls. Forms of protection (old or new) designed to allow a
secure flow of a resource (eg. ban on fruit tree cutting).
3. Civil Contract. The "norms of civility that govern daily contact" (p. 140). That
is, self-regulation of overly avaricious behaviour, for example, stealing fruit from
trees in another's compound or taking a woodpile left for later collection. These
may be reinforced by religion, but not usually thought of as religious. 
4. Initiation of new controlling institutions and rules. New forms of management
initiated by local institutions with or without outside instigation due to36 See Higgins and Mazula (1993) for a general discussion of the ideology, purpose and structure of
the VIDCO system. These authors outline  an attractive portrait of the VIDCO system as a means
to decentralized the political structure and promote equity, empowerment and economic
development. My own work suggests that a critical perspective is important in examining how this
structure acts as a means to ensure centralized party control rather than to decentralized political
power. See also Alexander (1994).
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environmental crisis (eg in woodfuel, soil erosion, etc). These could be wildlife
committees, natural resource committees, Village Development Committees
(VIDCOs)
36, etc.
The controls can be species specific, area specific, and land tenure specific. Species specific rules
include bans on cutting certain types of trees because they have religious significance (sacred
controls), or because they bear fruit people want to eat (pragmatic controls). Area specific rules
include bans on cutting trees in kopjes or mountains, because these areas are thought to be resting
places for spirits, or are sites for graves. Other area specific rules, which are also species specific,
include leaving trees in fields, either for shade, soil fertility benefits, or fruit (pragmatic) (Wilson
1989). Land tenure specific rules include restrictions on users in land areas considered "private"
such as the homestead area, and for some products, the fields. Areas considered "common
property" or what I am calling "communal use areas" such as grazing or bush areas, have different
rules, such as bans on cutting live trees of any type, and admonishments not to "cut recklessly".
Communal use areas rely heavily on civil contract and pragmatic controls to prevent exhaustion of
resources. 
This codification of types of controls and management systems provides a useful
framework in the study of resettlement. Most of the same dimensions are found, although with
somewhat different relative prominence. Traditional and sacred controls, for example, are more17
weakly formed in resettlement, while government institutions have greater presence and power.
In the PRA workshops, a Tenure Diagram exercise was designed to collect data on the
rules, responsible institutions, and degree of compliance and enforcement in natural resource use
and management. Tables have been compiled for firewood, poles, wild fruits, fields, kopjes,
thatching grass, herbs, grazing areas, river areas/dams and wetlands. Here I show data from one
village on firewood as an example.
Table 2. Tenure Data for Firewood by Village 4.
FIREWOOD RULES INSTITUTIONS ENFORCEMENT/
COMPLIANCE
VILLAGE 4 Women: no cutting or
burning live trees; don't use
plantation trees for firewood
Men: no cutting of live trees
(except thorn trees) in kopjes,









pay fine to the chief;
people sneak in from
CAs at night and cut
down trees
rules followed in
kopjes but not well in
grazing areas; those
caught are fined
VIDCO = Village Development Committee
CA = Communal Area
NRB = Natural Resources Board
The major findings from this exercise are as follows. Rules can be species specific, such as
a ban on cutting certain types of trees (eg. mobola plum, Shona muhacha), or in using particularly
species for firewood ("plantation" trees-eucalyptus). People are also directed by the NRB to avoid
cutting any live tree except thorn trees. There are also area and tenure specific rules, such as
special controls on cutting in kopjes or grazing areas, or in other people's fields (cutting in one's
own field being allowed). The legitimacy and viability of rules in a given area will determine the37 Interview with Resettlement Officer, July 10 1996.
38 Muhacha is also used extensively by traditional healers, who use roots and bark for different
remedies. Fruits are also eaten (Drummond and Coates Palgrave 1973: 17-19).
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vulnerability of the resource to unsustainable use. The case of poles, is a good example. Since
VIDCO permission is required to cut poles in eucalyptus woodlots, people also source poles in
other areas, where controls are more favourable or weakly enforced, such as in one's own fields or
kopje areas. 
There are complex rules involving a fair number of institutions in the management of the
woodlands. VIDCOs, the Village Chairman, the Resettlement Officer, the Natural Resources
Board (NRB) and the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) are the state supported institutions
involved. Spirit mediums, the Chief, and village elders are "traditional" institutions, which claim
legitimacy through lineage, special connection to the ancestors, or special knowledge through
experience. The local chief lives in a nearby Communal Area, and has no official authority in the
Resettlement Area.
37 Nevertheless, some people have carried allegiance to the Chief with them
into resettlement, and hence attribute some authority to him. Chiefs get mention in relation to
fields in terms of establishing the sacred chisi, that is, the day(s) off ploughing, an important part
of traditional culture. In cases where traditional rules are violated, people are said to be dealt with
by the Chief, who may levy a fine, such as a goat. In the case of firewood, there is brief mention
of spirit mediums and village elders in one village. This is in relation to the ban on cutting mobola
plumtree (Shona muhacha), which is considered sacred to the ancestors.
38 Traditional institutions
have a larger role for some other products and resource areas, particularly herbs, kopjes, and river
areas, these being associated with traditional medicine, and sacred areas. Kopjes are used as burial
sites, as well as being thought to be preferred places for ancestral spirits to reside. River areas,39 These spirits are not ancestral but something translated as "mermaids" (Shona nzuzu). Generally
malevolent, they are thought to "take" people, who may then re-emerge as traditional healers.
40 Traditional institutions and customs form a large topic in themselves, which I address elsewhere
(see Goebel 1997, Chapter Four). In general, traditional institutions are poorly formed in
resettlement, as people are not settled according to lineage, and have not named Headmen. Chiefs
have no official power in resettlement. The new state institutions of the RO and the VIDCOs have
the bulk of local administrative power.
41 There are numerous relevant pieces of legislation, but the most important here are the Natural
Resources Act (1941), the Forest Act (Amended 1981), the Parks and Wildlife Act (1975), the Water
Act (1976), the Communal Forest Produce Act (1982), and the Communal Land Act (1982). See
Nkala 1996.
42 PRA data; Interview with Resettlement Officer, July 10 1996.
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especially pools, are thought to be inhabited by spirits.
39 Harvesting of wild fruits is also under
traditional rules which ban cutting and harvesting of unripe fruit.
40 
In most cases, however, the major institutions involved in the area are part of the state.
The Natural Resources Board (NRB) is the main rule making body, working together with
Forestry Commission to enforce government legislation.
41 VIDCOs and Village Chairmen (the
official village level representatives to the state), Village Neighbourhood Watch (appointed by the
NRB), the Agritex worker, and the Resettlement Office work together to monitor the situation for
the NRB. The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) is called in for enforcement, and has the power
to levy fines.
42 
People's views on the nature of the rules and the institutions involved are fairly consistent.
However, there is a strong indication that many of the rules are not followed well. Even more
important than understanding the rules governing resources is understanding which types of rules
are most likely to be violated and why.
The tenure data suggests that rules instituted by government bodies such as the NRB,
Agritex, or Resettlement Office are as likely to be broken as sacred controls imposed by43 People report that rules in kopjes, another communal use area, are mostly followed. However,
physical evidence contradicts this. In some kopjes, so many trees have been cut that graves are
becoming uncovered. It is unclear if this destruction is caused by CA residents or the settlers
themselves.
44 Agritex worker, August 25 1996.
45 A notable exception could be the apparent adherence to the ban on cutting fruit trees. When asked
why people avoid cutting fruit trees, the overwhelming answer is: "because we want to eat the fruits"
(Household Schedule III. 14).
20
traditional leaders like the Chief or spirit mediums. In river areas, for example, both government
and sacred rules are extensively violated. Rules against cutting wild fruit trees and picking unripe
fruit, which are attributed to both traditional and government institutions are reportedly followed
well. What does seem clear is that where the nature or location of a given resource makes it more
visible to the responsible authority, then rules are more likely to be kept. For example, rules in
eucalyptus plantations are mostly followed, probably because a plantation is a discrete entity that
can be patrolled. Meanwhile, rules in grazing areas, which are spread out and hence more difficult
to monitor, are sometimes kept, and sometimes not, and extensive mention is made of resource
poaching in this area by CA residents bringing their cattle. Tenure is also important. Rules in
fields, where tenure is private-like, are well followed. Since a farmer has a right to resources in his
or her fields, like poles, firewood and thatching grass, there is an incentive to enforce the rules
protecting this right. Communal use areas such as grazing areas and rivers are less effectively
protected by the rules.
43
These findings indicate that in most cases, the institutions as they stand are not fully
effective in sustainably managing the resources. Particularly in communal use areas, it is
reportedly difficult to control people's practices.
44 In this sense, pragmatic and civil controls, as
per Nhira and Fortmann's discussion are weakly formed, especially in common property areas.
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The problem may lie in the fact that the rules of resource management are not developed
by or in consultation with RA residents, but imposed by state bodies. The main rule makers are
the NRB and the Resettlement Office. Enforcement is in the form of the state police (ZRP). The
VIDCOs, Village Chairmen, and Neighbourhood Watch are "watchdogs" for these rule-making
bodies, not active participants in the formulation of the rules. Hence, while  VIDCOs may appear
as decentralized democratic institutions, giving local people a "voice" in government, their actual
function maintains centralized control. In practice,
Local authorities... were free to articulate 'felt needs', <but> were not in a position
to redress them; ministries regarded local authorities primarily as policy
implementing, not formulating agencies; planning remained the realm of 'experts'
employed by the government (Alexander 1994: 330).
As such, then, while the management practices in the RA involve "local institutions", they are not
technically "communally-based resource management regimes" (Murphree 1991: 5).  People
interpret the rules as "imposed", and hence there is an oppositional dynamic in the management of
resources. These findings suggest that Grundy 1995 and Murphree and Cumming 1993 are
correct in their view of institutional development in Resettlement. Resettlement is "still based on
the colonial model of centralised bureaucratic control with assumptions about appropriate
technology strategies for resource use", which marginalize rather than reinforce any collective
control or "locally-evolved ecological knowledge" (Grundy 1995: 112). This inhibits "the
institutional dynamics required for effective common property management regimes" (Grundy46 There has been increasing interest in the role of local institutions in natural resource management
in Zimbabwe (Murombedzi 1990; Murphree 1991; Nhira (ed) 1995). Particularly in relation to
common property resources, local institutions have been seen as key to sustainable management
practices. However, "local" institutions are not necessarily "indigenous", and are not always seen by
local people to represent their interests or perspectives. Hill (1996), building on Murombedzi (1992),
discusses how CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources),
a program developed to bring the benefits of resource conservation to the local people who bear the
brunt of this management, has in some cases provided an opportunity to extend centralized state
control, rather than increase local control of resources. 
47 This problem was also observed in the two Resettlement villages in Fortmann's Rapid Rural
Appraisal sample (Fortmann and Nabane 1992), mentioned by Scoones and Matose (1993), and
found by Grundy (1995).
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1995: 112; see Murphree and Cumming 1993, to whom she refers).
46 Hence, if the focus is cast
on the practices and institutions of settlers themselves, in a context where a radical change in the
nature of local institutions is not on the horizon, then a change to private tenure as recommended
by the Land Tenure Commission could make sense. However, the next stage of the discussion
throws this into doubt.
3. "Poachers" in the Woodlands
The most talked about problem in the first round of village meetings was that of
neighbours from Communal Areas (CAs) coming into the resettlement and stealing resources such
as firewood, poles, and thatching grass, and bringing herds of cattle to graze.
47 A fence erected to
protect the area was stolen, and efforts to stop poachers through threats and violence only drove
the thieves to steal under cover of darkness. The resettlement is bordered on two sides by two
different CAs, both of which are extensively deforested. See Figure 2 which shows a portion of
the border shared by one of the CAs and a resettlement village. The black line forms the
boundary, to the right of which lies the CA and to the left, the resettlement. The CA is nearly
denuded of forest, being given over largely to arable fields. In the RA, by contrast, pockets of48 Village meetings, plus interview with Ward Councillor, September 13 1995 (Field Notes I, p. 10).
Also found by Grundy (1995).
49 CA neighbours also had a history of collecting firewood from the area that later became a
resettlement scheme in Elliott's study (Elliott 1995: 11).
50 Interview with former Ward Councillor, September 14 1995.
51 Establishing clear categories of "insiders" and "outsiders" is commonly acknowledged in the
literature as crucial to successful common property management (Arnold 1993).
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forest, plantations and trees in grazing areas still stand. 
People in the CAs need the resources, but also feel entitled to the resources in resettlement
because of their role in helping the guerrillas during the war, who chased out the white farmers
resident on the land.
48 In one of the study villages, settlers told of how some nearby CA residents
had even started ploughing in area, before the settlers came. In another village, which lies right on
the border with a CA, extensive woodland resource pillaging was allegedly undertaken before the
resettlement village was even founded.
49 This sense of entitlement felt by CA residents has
reportedly increased since 1986 when changes in district boundaries meant that the resettlement
area became part of the same district as the bordering Communal Lands. Before that, the RA had
been part of the district shared by commercial farms, and police had been very active in arresting
tree cutters.
50 
Why are the Resettlement residents unable to stop their CA neighbours from using "their"
resources?
51 Part of the answer is clearly historical, lying in the sense of entitlement to the
resources felt by the CA people. The lack of authority of local institutions as outlined above, is
another factor inhibiting the clear establishment of "insiders and outsiders". Another institutional
problem seems to be that the rules are designed for management practices of the RA residents, as
if they lived in a sealed environment. There is no special body to deal with poaching problems.52 Interview with former Ward Councillor, September 14 1995. In an interview at the local branch
of the Natural Resources Board, October 7 1996, officials said that they were well aware of the
problem of poaching of resources by the Communal Area residents. However, given lack of resources
themselves, they were powerless to put into effect the educational campaigns, monitoring and law
enforcement practices that might help the situation. Similarly, the District Administrator for Hwedza
said he is well aware of the poaching problem, but it is difficult to find a solution. They have been
relying on persuasion, but he feels that stricter rules and enforcement are necessary (Interview,
February 18 1997).
53 Also in Grundy (1995).
54 The difficulty people feel in giving up rights in their former homes in Communal Lands was
recognized by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement in 1986: to give up
traditional rights in Communal Areas is an "alien if not impossible practice for many people for social
and cultural reasons" (Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement 1986: 24). The issue
was mentioned again in the 1992 Report.
55 Household Schedule I. 7.
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The issue has been raised with the District Administrator, but so far no action has been taken.
52
Elliott (1994 and 1995) found that settlers had difficulty protecting the use of firewood
and other resources from "outsiders" because many of them were relatives of the settlers.
53 
Elliott's study suggested that the RA residents still felt very connected to their former homes,
often maintaining graves, homes and land there, and very involved with members of their
extended family still in the CA.
54 
In my case study, a somewhat different picture emerged. While villagers agreed in general
village meetings that some of the resource poachers from the CAs were their relatives and this
made it more difficult to stop them, more detailed questioning in household interviews made it
clear that this was hardly the general case. Most respondents said their relatives do not collect
resources from the RA. The reason for this lies less with respect for resource tenure than with the
fact that most relatives live too far away to make resource collection in the RA an attractive
option.
55 Taking the whole sample from the four study villages, the overall average distance to RA
settlers' former homes is 57km, which could take about one to two hours by bus. Further, only56 Household Schedule I. 1, 2.
57 Household Schedule, I. 3, 4, 5.
58 Interview with local Secondary School Headmaster, April 11 1996.
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18% of the sample live within reasonable walking distance (that is < or = to 5km).
56 Settlers have
remained connected to former homes, visiting relatives and receiving visits for funerals, traditional
ceremonies and to maintain contact.
57 However, distance precludes these relatives from making
extensive use of the natural resources in the RA. In general, it should not be assumed that
resource pillagers coming into RAs from CAs are close relatives of RA settlers, and that this is the
main reason for settlers' difficulty in preventing these "outsiders" from using the resource.
Rather than familial connection between settlers and "poachers", there may be another
aspect to RA/CA social relationships at work. As mentioned earlier, people were originally
suspicious about the resettlement process, and recruitment of the first settlers was difficult.
According to a key informant,
58 the first settlers were not volunteers, but were chosen by their
headmen in the Communal Area villages. These settlers formed three main groups. The first were
the "landless", in the sense that they did not belong to lineage groups entitled to land in that
particular village. The second group were undesirables, such as thieves and suspected witches.
The third group were pushed out for making leadership bids, and hence were viewed as a threat to
the incumbent headman. All three groups were in some ways "social outcasts". Hence, there was
pre-existent antagonism between the settlers and the CA residents which has perhaps found
expression in the conflict over resource use in the resettlement.
4. Solutions: Resource Sharing and Privatization 
Work on Zimbabwe's social forests commonly suggests forms of resource sharing in cases59 See Matose (1994) on conflicts with CA neighbours of gazetted state forests, Grundy (1995) and
Nhira and Fortmann (1993) on conflicts with CA neighbours to Resettlement. 
60 Matose documents the retaliation of "poachers" in a state forest in Zimbabwe, reacting to Forestry
Commission's coercive efforts to end neighbours' use of the woodland products. People cut more and
bigger poles than they actually needed, unnecessarily cut trees when gathering caterpillars and felled
trees to collect honey, all in order to spite the Forestry Commission (Matose 1994: 81-5). There is
some evidence from the study site that poachers' practices of CA neighbours have increased in
destructiveness as RA residents step up efforts to stop them.
61 See Grundy (1995). Grundy suggests interventions to encourage planting of multipurpose trees in
private areas like households, gardens, and fields, and some community woodlots, plus strategies to
improve the longevity of poles such as creosote or diesel treatments, use of alternative fuel sources
such as dung and agricultural residues, and use of improved brick kilns or unburnt types of bricks to
reduce use of fuelwood (pp. 129; 140-4).
62 This in spite of admitting that a fence erected earlier had been removed.
63 Field Assistants' Diaries. Notes for September 1996.
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of conflicts over access to woodland and other natural resources.
59 Efforts to exclude people who
both need and feel entitled to resources are said to be fruitless, and can often lead to further
destruction of the resources as people resort to covert and often spiteful actions.
60 The logic of
resource sharing is attractive, especially when linked with other strategies designed to decrease
people's reliance on indigenous woodlands.
61 However, it is very difficult to imagine a form
resource sharing could successfully take in this context. Unlike in Grundy's site, settlers in Sengezi
feel very strongly that the CA residents are not entitled to the resources, and that they should be
excluded. They would like nothing more than a huge fence, which they say they would patrol.
62 
This feeling of the settlers is matched by the equally ferocious view of the Communal Land
neighbours. Informal interviews revealed outrage that settlers tried to exclude them from the
resources, arguing that they fought for the land during the war, just like the settlers. They
admitted to purposefully destructive and "uncivil" behaviour such as telling their herdboys to let
cattle graze in settlers fields during the growing season.
63 Furthermore, considering that the
current institutions are not succeeding in managing the communal use resources even among the27
settlers, it is unlikely they would serve successfully with an expanded user group originating from
different tenure systems. Grundy acknowledges this by recognizing the need for "devolvement" of
management to the village level so that people have the power to manage the resource (Grundy
1995: 140). There is also the problem of lack of social cohesion in resettlement villages caused by
people being settled from different original villages, the presence of different religions, tensions
caused by wealth differentiation, and gender differences in resource use and perception (see
Goebel 1997). Would this mean that each RA village would work out a sharing agreement with a
discrete set of CA residents? How would these be defined? Whose rules would be used? Clearly, a
resource sharing program would take a great deal of study, institutional change, and careful
negotiations. 
This may be the only way forward for resettlement villages that remain demarcated
according to the original village layout. As mentioned above, government has accepted many of
the 1993 Land Tenure Commission's recommendations, including those on resettlement. Among
those accepted is that all current resettlement villages of both Model A family farms and Model B
cooperatives, be redemarcated into private holdings which would include homestead, fields and
grazing areas. All new resettlement schemes should follow this pattern. The permit system should
be abandoned, and settlers be given 99 year leases with options to purchase after an initial ten
year "trial" period, in which settlers demonstrate serious farming intentions and good practices. 
In the study site, the Resettlement Officer began talks with villagers about redemarcation
of villages in mid-1996. As it is not government's intention to impose redemarcation on
established resettlement villages against people's will, it is unlikely that redemarcation will occur in64 District Administrator of Hwedza (Interview, February 18 1997); Resettlement Officer, Sengezi
(Interview, February 19 1997).
65 Research Assistant Field Diary, Village 3, Book I.
66 A recent article in The Sunday Mail describes village level conflicts over redemarcation in Soti
Source Resettlement in Gutu. The article states that two years ago, when farmers were consulted by
the Land Tenure Commission, 95% of farmers agreed to a change to private small scale farms. Now,
when consulted on the best means to implement redemarcation, only 55% of farmers agree to it, while
the rest oppose. Opposers resist on the grounds of losing the investments they have made in their
homesteads, including large houses and orchards, and that many farmers were too old to start afresh
with new houses to build. Some farmers suggested that they be given title deeds collectively as a
village ("Farmers in bitter debate over land move" The Sunday Mail October 26 1996: 1). 
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the study site villages as consensus on the issue is unlikely to be reached.
64 In one of my study
villages, people responded to the issue of redemarcation in three main ways. Some strongly
support, others as strongly reject, and a third group does not know what to think. There are some
clear divisions along gender, wealth and age lines. Women tend not to want to leave the village,
mourning the loss of social contact with friends. They also complain loudly about all the hard
work it will be, making bricks and clearing land. Although some men are reluctant, men are more
likely to support redemarcation than women, speaking of the need for bigger pastures and arable
lands. In terms of wealth status, the better off farmers, especially "Master Farmers" tend to be
keen on redemarcation, talking about the benefits of having larger fields and pastures to grow new
crops like tobacco and other cash crops. Those who are worse off see no point in having more
fields when they are not even fully utilizing those that they have. Older people also tend to oppose
the move, saying they lack the energy to start afresh. However there are some elders who
welcome it, thinking of getting more land to pass on to their inheritors.
65 Similar responses are
being found elsewhere in the country.
66 This means that the problems of communally used
woodlands will remain in many resettlement villages.67 Informal Interview, July 10, 1996. Field Book II, p. 24.
68 Interviews July 10 1996 and August 25 1996.
69 Interview with NRB officials October 7 1996.
70 Interview February 18 1997.
71 Interview February 18 1997.
72 Raising this issue in early village meetings in September 1995, before the Resettlement Officer had
been directed to discuss it with villagers, caused much confusion and suspicion. I therefore did not
include the question in household interviews carried out from February to July of 1996, and chose
an informal route of key informant interviews to explore this question.
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For many old resettlement villages and all the newly established ones, however, the
dynamic will change. Government plans to eliminate common property areas completely with a
change to private tenure.
New villages in the study site are following the private holdings pattern, with each family
being allotted 30 hectares of self-contained land. Local officials, including the Resettlement
Officer,
67 the Agritex worker,
68 the Natural Resources Board at the Rural District Council
69 and
the District Administrator,
70 echoed the thinking of the Land Tenure Commission in predicting
that resource management in the formerly communal use areas of grazing and bush areas in
resettlement would improve through privatization. The Resettlement Officer felt that this move
would end poaching of resources by Communal Area neighbours, because whereas now people
think of the woodlands and grazing areas as communal resources, no one would dare to poach
from someone's private property. The District Administrator pointed out that with private
property, poaching becomes a private legal issue, wherein the owner can take the poachers to
court.
71 Settler views mirror this thinking.
72 A former Village Chairman said that privatization
would clarify the ownership of trees: "then it's clear who owns the trees". This clarity, he felt,
would reduce deforestation. As it is now, he said, people just say the trees are there from God, so73 Interview July 29 1995. Field Book I, p. 6.
74 Interview October 7 1996, Field Book II, p. 31.
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everyone can use them.
73 After the Resettlement Officer had discussed the issue in village
meetings, another informant, a local ZanuPF committee chairman and prominent farmer, said that
people had felt the move would be good for looking after resources.
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It is important to point out that the Land Tenure Commission and local people, both
officials and settlers, have slightly different perceptions of the problem of resource depletion. The
Commission emphasizes poorly developed institutions and lack of tenure security which leads to
low incentive for investment. Settlers and local officials, on the other hand, emphasize the
determination and often the spitefulness of the Communal Area neighbours. The Commission did
discover the problem of conflict between Communal Land neighbours and settlers over common
property resources in Resettlement Areas. It notes that the Communal Land neighbours often feel
they have a greater right to the resources than the settlers, who often come from more distant
villages (Rukuni 1994, Vol. 1: 63). The Commission also locates this problem within the wider
issue of the development of Resettlement Areas without thorough consideration of the conditions
in neighbouring Communal Areas (Rukuni 1994, Vol. 1: 123). However, in the final analysis, the
Commission emphasizes weakly developed local institutions and tenure in resettlement as the
problems in common property management areas:
lack of a clear management authority is responsible for the deterioration of the
environment. The tenure system does not encourage proper utilisation of resources
and does not define those accountable (Rukuni 1994, Vol. 1: 69).
Since Resettlement lacks the traditional institutional structures found in the Communal Areas, the31
Commission recommends a change to private tenure rather than a programme of strengthening
local institutions. In the technical reports the Commission adds the more conventional view that
links private ownership to incentive for investment. Good conservation is linked to freehold
tenure and land having a market value:
In the absence of these two conditions, as is the case in communal and resettlement
areas, farmers have no incentive to invest for the future (Rukuni 1994, Vol. 2: 83).
Hence, while the Land Tenure Commission and local actors agree on privatization as a solution,
there are important differences in their analyses of the source of the original problem.
This dissonance in perception opens a space for questioning whether privatization will
really solve the problem. From the evidence of this study, it is doubtful if changing tenure will end
poaching by communal area neighbours. Firstly, successful exclusion relies not only on clear
rights, but on a physical input, fencing, and the labour issue involved in patrolling ones own
resource area. In the new settlements, demarcated in the new way, the Resettlement Officer
mentioned that fencing had not been provided, and it was unclear if it would be. Hence it could be
left up to settlers themselves, who are unlikely to have the resources to fence 30 hectares.
Secondly, the belief that private tenure keeps outsiders away from resources directly contradicts
some settlers' own practices. Many settlers admit to illegally entering the commercial farms that
share borders with some of the resettlement villages, to collect firewood and other woodland
products. Finally, the approach does not directly deal with the main source of the problem: the
real need of communal area farmers for the resources since their areas have been depleted, plus
their profound sense of entitlement to those resources. While the Land Tenure Commission is
thoroughly researched and very astute, in the final analysis it fails on this particular issue to rise75 This conceptual problem stands in other literature on resource depletion in resettlement. Nkala
(1996), for example, writing with the benefit of the Land Tenure Commission's findings, still
attributes resource degradation in resettlement to a combination of tenure insecurity, poor land quality
and overall poverty. Poaching by neighbours in Communal Lands is not even mentioned.
76 The Chavunduka Report (Chavunduka 1982) warned against large-scale resettlement, arguing
instead for improvement of peasant farming in Communal Lands. See Drinkwater 1989.
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above a central problem it identifies itself: the past failure to plan resettlement hand in hand with
conditions prevailing in neighbouring Communal Areas.
75
It is true that the Land Tenure Commission appropriately focuses most attention on the
Communal Areas, which harbour the majority of Zimbabwe's population, and suffer the greatest
environmental and development problems. It recognizes that the areas are under profound
population and resource depletion pressure, and hence recommends the intensification of the
resettlement programme through the breaking up of more large-scale farms (Rukuni 1994,
Executive Summary: 1). Through this, the Land Tenure Commission seems less inclined to
sidestep the question of land distribution than its predecessor, the Chavunduka Report (1982)
76:
"land distribution is highly skewed in Zimbabwe. The status quo is not politically, socially or
economically sustainable" (Rukuni 1994, Executive Summary: 3). But the focus on land tenure,
reorganization of communal lands, and the treating of each sector of the rural land groups in
isolation, still makes room for government to adopt strategies that can avoid the question of
large-scale land redistribution. The focus on tenure, although important, can act like the focus on
peasant practices in the past to sidestep the basic problem of land access. It remains to be seen if
the government's seriousness in pursuing tenure reforms will serve to deflect any real efforts
towards increasing land access for Zimbabwe's rural majority. 
Conclusion33
This article has raised five main points concerning using privatization to solve common
property failure in woodland management in resettlement. First, tenure insecurity does not appear
to be a problem in resettlement, and therefore should not be used, as the Land Tenure
Commission uses it, as a justification for privatization. Second, private tenure does appear to
improve woodland management, as evidenced by tree planting in homestead areas, and better
compliance with rules in fields. However, this effect may have more to do with the proximity of
the trees to the homestead, and/or their association with arable land than with tenure per se. Also,
the complexity of people's relationship to the woodlands, in that they use multiple sources for
various products, suggests that privatization may reduce some people's access to certain products.
The third point is, therefore, that if maintaining equitable use of the forest in resettlement is a
goal, then privatization may jeopardize this. Fourth, "local" institutions are not "indigenous", and
rules are in general, imposed by state bodies. This explains some internal reasons for failures in
rule compliance in common property regimes by the settlers themselves. It also explains part of
the problem of exclusion of "outsiders" in the common property areas in the resettlement. This
supports the Land Tenure Commission's targeting of institutional weakness as part of the resource
management problem. However, a greater problem appears to be the "outsiders'" sense of
entitlement to the resources in the resettlement, coupled with their own profound need. This is the
fifth point. Settlers' lack of care in common property areas in the resettlement may indeed be less
linked to the institutional problems than to despair that outsiders are destroying the resources. In
the many resettlement villages not likely to demarcate along the proposed private holdings
pattern, this problem will remain. In those that do demarcate, and in new villages, privatization is
unlikely to solve this problem, as there is little evidence that private tenure acts to deter outsider34
use, either in state forests or commercial farms. In general, a plan for sustainable management of
the forests in resettlement that does not take account of the wider problem of land shortage and
resource depletion in Communal Areas, is likely to have little effect.35
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